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Abstract 
This paper enlarges the scope of inter-organizational learning and strategic renewal research to the 
ongoing debate on whether companies should mainly try to exploit current trajectories rather than 
explore new opportunities. Scholars studying exploration and exploitation have been highlighting 
for  long  the  essential  trade-offs  firms  make  in  undertaking  these  activities  offering  significant 
support for models in which exploration and exploitation need not always be competing activities, 
but can and should be complementary. Little is known, however, about the specific mechanisms 
that drive firms’ tendencies to engage in either activity or about whether and how they actually 
balance  the  two  across  organizational  boundaries.  Being  an  assortment  of  boundary  spanning 
operations, the Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) context allows us to analyze how focal firms can 
articulate  explorative  and  exploitative  activities  through  internal  and  external  resources.  More 
precisely, we propose that firms could use CVC investments to resolve the exploration-exploitation 
tension overtime across their organizational boundaries. We test our theoretical model using patent 
and  financial  performance  data  for  the  entire  population  of  U.S.  public  firms  active  in  CVC 
investments over the period 1996-2006. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation  researches  increasingly  recognize  resources  residing  outside  firm’s  boundaries  as 
vehicles  of  new  knowledge  to  foster  strategic  change  (Sobrero  &  Roberts,  2001;  Cassiman  & 
Veugelers, 2006). Indeed, various forms of collaborations such as alliances (Gulati, 1998; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf,  2006),  joint  ventures  (Kogut,  1991),  M&As  (Ahuja  &  Katila,  2001)  and  equity 
investments (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b; Schildt et al., 2005) have been analyzed under 
this perspective. However, little research has been carried out regarding Corporate Venture Capital 
(CVC) and no studies, to our knowledge, have yet investigated the relationship between this form of 
external venturing and the set of investments pursued internally by corporations.  
To address this gap, we take a ―search‖ perspective (Katila, 2000; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Katila 
& Chen, 2008) where firms look for opportunities in two distinct sectors of a knowledge space. One 
is knowledge familiar to the firm and the other is knowledge that is new to it (e.g., Levinthal & 
March, 1981; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). The former allows firm to exploit its current knowledge base 
to create new outputs, while the latter is focused on the exploration of unfamiliar knowledge. 
Under  this  framework,  we  analyze  the  potential  embedded  in  CVC  activities  for  balancing 
exploration and exploitation both within the firm and beyond its organizational boundaries. More 
precisely, we consider the focal firms (i.e. corporations owning a CVC fund) vis a vis their related 
portfolios of CVC-backed companies to examine the proportion of exploration and exploitation in 
both the domains. Internally, the focal firm may shift from exploitation to exploration or vice versa 
(i.e., transitioning overtime from prior to new knowledge). Externally, the focal firm can run a 
portfolio  of  CVC-backed  firms  which,  as  a  whole,  may  also  interchange  exploitation  and 
exploration overtime (i.e., transitioning from prior to new knowledge).  
Under  this  perspective,  the  blend  of  exploration-exploitation  pursued  through  external  CVC 
investments can complement a more traditional form of exploration-exploitation pursued internally 
through R&D expenditures and/or corporate diversification. As suggested by the previous literature 
(e.g. Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008), corporations could encounter 
challenges in balancing exploration and exploitation within boundaries. We posit that they could 
use CVC investments to reconcile these conflicting pressures. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we consider CVC investments as a tool to create 
not  only  explorative  opportunities,  but  also  exploitative  opportunities.  Most  previous  studies 
emphasized the role of CVC investments as conduits for novel knowledge from innovative start-ups 
to corporate investors  (i.e. Siegel,  Siegel,  &  MacMillan, 1988; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006), by 
conceptualizing CVC investment as an exploratory process through which firms attempt to acquire 
new capabilities. Taking a somewhat different course, we offer theory and empirical evidence to Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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demonstrate how CVC investments are conduits not only for explorative, but also for exploitative 
learning. Second, we foster the idea that the balance between explorative and exploitative strategies 
needs to be analyzed overtime within and beyond the focal firm. In the CVC context, this can be 
translated  into  the  investigation  of  the  interplay  between  internal  and  external  sources  of 
knowledge. The former based on R&D projects, the latter focused on knowledge embedded in 
highly potential start-ups. Finally, we clearly assess the performance implications of disentangling 
exploration and exploitation across the organizational boundaries of firms. More specifically, we 
use Tobin’s q (the market valuation of a firm over the replacement value of its assets) to assess the 
market response towards alternative exploration-exploitation configurations pursued by the focal 
firms through CVC activities (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Oriani & Sobrero, 2008). 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of 
balancing  exploration-exploitation  are  summarized.  Second,  we  explain  how  exploration  and 
exploitation may cross the firms’ organizational boundaries in the context of CVC investments. 
Third, we describe the sample, data sources and operationalization of  the constructs. Forth, we 
present some preliminary results of our regressions. Finally, implications and avenues for future 
work are discussed. 
 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS  
 
The Exploration-Exploitation Tension  
 
The behavioral theory of the firm, developed by Cyert and March (1963) assumes that firms have 
some degree of control over their market environment and that they adapt to their habitat through 
learning processes. Learning takes place after that feedback loops bring new market knowledge to 
the  organization,  which  confronts  the  firm  with  particular  problems.  Firms  respond  to  such 
problems through what is called ―search‖ behavior, by which they pursue new or alternative ways 
of doing (Huygens et al., 2001). Accordingly, firms display two basic types of search behavior: they 
can  search  in  the  neighborhood  of  current  knowledge,  or  they  can  search  for  radically  new 
alternatives. Cyert and March (1963) treated this distinction primarily in organizational terms, but 
stressed its applicability at the competitive level (Huygens et al., 2001). Nelson and Winter (1982) 
also embraced this dichotomy by referring to it as local and distant search and, finally, this dual 
nature of search has been argued to closely resemble March’s (1991) paradox of exploitation versus 
exploration (Nerkar, 2003; Katila & Chen, 2008). Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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In particular, an exploitation strategy includes such things as refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution. Exploration, on the other hand, includes things 
captured  by  terms  such  as  search,  variation,  risk  taking,  experimentation,  play,  flexibility, 
discovery, innovation (e.g. Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Levinthal 
and  March  similarly  stated  that  exploration  involves  ―a  pursuit  of  new  knowledge,‖  whereas 
exploitation involves ―the use and development of things already known‖ (1993: 105).  
Scholars  studying  exploration  and  exploitation  have  been  highlighting  for  long  the  essential 
trade-offs firms make in undertaking these activities offering insights on the subject across a wide 
variety  of  theoretical  disciplines  and  empirical  focuses  (Cyert  &  March,  1963;  Mintzberg  & 
McHugh,  1985;  Rosenkopf  &  Almeida,  2003).  Many  scholars  argued,  in  particular,  that  firms 
generally experience difficulties in combining exploration and exploitation. As a consequence, they 
prefer  one  over  the  other  search  mode  as  exploration  and  exploitation  cannot  be  undertaken 
simultaneously (March, 2006).  
However, a second group of studies pointed out that focusing only on one of the two searches 
could not be the right solution for the firm’s growth. On one hand, undertaking only an exploitative 
strategy  risks to create the so called ―competence traps‖ (March, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Namely,  when  the  need  to  adapt  to  major  changes  in  the  competitive  environment  arises, 
organizational inertia and lack of absorptive capacity have been proposed to preclude the firm’s 
effective adaptation to the new circumstances by not being able to absorb the required new external 
knowledge (Volberda, 1996; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999) and stifle a firm’s ability to alter its 
course  in  a  changing  market  (Cyert  &  March,  1963;  Lavie  &  Rosenkopf,  2006).  Similarly,  a 
strategy over-emphasizing exploration can lead firms to innovate without exploiting their advances 
for profit (Levinthal & March, 1993; Gupta, Smith & Shalley 2006).  
Starting from these considerations, researchers started to agree in favor of a concurrent need for 
both  exploration  and  exploitation,  thus,  suggesting  that  too  little  of  either  might  reduce  firm’s 
performance over time (Levinthal & March, 1993; Ancona et al., 2001; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 
Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006). This implies that exploration and exploitation need not always be 
competing activities, but can be also complementary (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006; Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; Katila & Chen, 2008). The main contribution introduced by 
this stream of research has been to abandon the representation of exploration and exploitation as 
two extremes of a continuum in favor of an orthogonal view where the two can coexist. 
Within this last stream of literature, researchers proposed the concept of ambidexterity (Benner 
& Tushman, 2003; Burgelman, 1996; Christensen, Suarez & Utterback, 1998; Levinthal, 1997) as a 
mechanism  to  help  organizations  realizing  the  above-mentioned  balance.  Accordingly,  if Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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exploration and exploitation occur in different  domains, the two may be thought as orthogonal 
tasks. Hence, exploration can be pursued in one module of a modular system while exploitation is 
pursued  in  another,  enabling  ambidextrous  strategies  (Lavie  &  Rosenkopf,  2006).  Research  on 
inter-organizational learning, for instance, points to the fact that organizations have access not only 
to internally owned resources but also to resources in their external environments (Powell, Koput & 
Smith-Doerr  1996)  through  alliances  (Gulati,  1998;  Lavie  &  Rosenkopf,  2006),  joint  ventures 
(Kogut,  1991),  M&As    (Ahuja  &  Katila,  2001)  and  equity  investments  (Dushnitsky  &  Lenox, 
2005a, 2005b; Schildt et al., 2005). By considering internal and external resources as two distinct 
domains (i.e. modules), these studies suggest that the former can be used for exploitative goals, 
while the latter can be  seen as  vehicles  of new knowledge to  foster strategic change and thus 
exploration.  
Summarizing, scholars generally agree that balancing exploitation and exploration makes sense 
and may even be necessary for survival (e.g., Christensen, 1998; Lewin & Volberda, 1999). More 
precisely,  organizations  can  sustain  their  competitive  advantage  by  managing  for  short-term 
efficiency by emphasizing stability and control, as well as for long-term innovation by taking risks.  
However, these researchers have been mainly focused on the mechanics to balance exploration 
and  exploitation  by  studying  a  single  domain
1,  located only  inside  or  outside  organizational 
boundaries,  thus,  disregarding  the  possibility  that  conflicting  pressures  may  influence  search 
processes across boundaries. Furthermore, the few st udies analyzing the interactions between an 
internal and an external dimension have seen exploitation bounded within the firm and exploration 
exclusively pursued through external collaborations (Koza & Levin, 1998; Wahdwa & Kotha, 
2006). A comprehensive framework where exploration and exploitation coexists both within and 
beyond the firm’s boundaries and where the interactions between the two dimensions are analyzed 
yet misses.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Disentangling the Exploration-Exploitation Tension across Organizational Boundaries 
 
The pace and complexity of technological change create many uncertainties for organizations and 
these,  in  turn,  force  organizations  to  innovate  continuously  to  be  competitive.  In  technology-
intensive  industries,  often  organizations  do  not  possess  the  knowledge  required  to  produce 
innovations and are limited in their ability to produce knowledge purely through internal R&D 
                                                 
1 For a recent exception see Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006. Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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investments. To accumulate the necessary knowledge, many organizations turn therefore to external 
activities such as alliances, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and CVC investments (Schildt, 
Maula, & Keil, 2005).  
In this complex environment, Raisch & Birkinshaw (2008) recognized the need of a ―granular‖ 
view of innovation where (i) a firm’s innovation stream consists of various innovation initiatives 
(Benner  &  Tushman,  2003),  (ii)  the  exploitation  and  exploration  requirements  may  differ 
significantly from initiative to initiative (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) and (iii) even within each 
initiative,  some  elements  may  be  produced  by  re-implementing  existing  capabilities,  whereas 
developing others may rely on the exploration of new capabilities (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & 
Anderson, 2002). 
BMW’s new Rolls-Royce Phantom model, for example, consists of components that were taken 
from BMW’s existing 7-series cars (i.e., the V12 engine), components that were adapted to the 
luxury model’s specific requirements (i.e., the aluminum space frame body), and components that 
were radically new to  the firm  (i.e., the rear-hinged doors). Given this  variety, the analysis of 
boundary contexts at the business unit or corporate level may be misleading. Research should thus 
complement  a  system-level  analysis  with  a  more  fine-grained  investigation  of  external 
environments  and  their  interrelations  with  exploration-exploitation  structures,  contexts,  and 
characteristics (Raish & Birkinshaw, 2008).  
Under this lens, a firm can be represented as  the locus where the recombination of internal 
(Fleming, 2001; Nerkar, 2003) and external knowledge elements (Katila & Chen, 2008) takes place 
towards the creation of new innovative propositions. Firms can explore in some domains of action 
while exploiting in others, hence multilevel concepts and measures may be required to fully capture 
their exploitation and exploration activities. Prior research has demonstrated, indeed, that firms can 
coordinate  exploration-exploitation  efforts  overtime  and  in  different  areas,  such  as  across 
technological and organizational boundaries (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) or across technological 
and geographical domains (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). Conversely, studies that focus only on 
one domain of exploration-exploitation have been claimed to be sensitive to the choice of domain 
and to depict only a partial picture of firms’ balancing efforts (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). 
Expanding previous research on exploration-exploitation,  we propose that  accessing external 
knowledge may enable a focal firm to balance exploration and exploitation overtime (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf,  2006) by combining new elements with past elements (Katila & Ahuja, 2002) within 
and beyond the boundaries of the firm (Koza & Levin, 1998). More precisely, the search efforts of 
firms to innovate, as interplay between exploration and exploitation, may vary along three main 
dimensions: within, beyond and across firm’s boundaries.  Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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Corporate Venture Capital as Vehicle to Resolve the Exploration-Exploitation Tension across 
Boundaries 
 
In this study, we examine the role of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) investments as vehicle of 
exploration and exploitation across organizational boundaries.  
The  general  definition  of  corporate  venturing  available  in  the  literature  is  based  on  the 
classification  which  distinguishes  between  internal  and  external  venturing,  in  accordance  with 
whether the new ventures invested reside within or outside the existing corporation (Sharma & 
Chrisman, 1999). Following this criterion, firms can be split between those nurturing opportunities 
that are already in-house and primed to leverage corporate competencies (internal venturing) and, 
on  the  other  hand,  those  financing  autonomous  organizational  entities  that  reside  outside  the 
boundaries of the corporation (external venturing). In line with this literature, Corporate Venture 
Capital (CVC) investments are viewed as boundary spanning operations (Maula, 2001) and, thus, 
they belong to the class of external corporate venturing (Keil, 2004).  
More precisely, CVC is defined as minority equity investments in small, young and independent 
entrepreneurial ventures where the investors are established, non-financial firms with both financial 
and strategic goals (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2004, Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a and 2005b). The 
typical structure of CVC investments is depicted in Figure 1 where the focal firm (i.e. corporation) 
creates a CVC fund beyond its boundaries and directly supplies it with a certain stock of capital to 
finance a portfolio of companies (i.e. new ventures), which in turn contributes to the corporation’s 
financial and strategic goals (Ernst, Witt & Brachtendorf, 2005). 
 
---- Insert Fig. 1 Here ---- 
 
Some key elements univocally identify CVC activities from other external collaborations: 
 
1.  The  portfolio  companies  receiving  the  investment  are  separate  legal  entities  from  the 
corporation making the investment. 
2.  The purpose for the corporate investment is not purely financial, but also strategic.  
3.  The form of investment in the portfolio companies is equity, rather than debt or other modes 
of financing. 
 Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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A firm’s portfolio of ties  with  other external  entities  can be a key factor to  firm’s success. 
External ties enabled Apple leaders, for instance, to focus on their strengths, such as architectural 
design, while leveraging their partners’ resources and market positions. And the Apple story is not 
unique: many firms rely on building portfolios of external ties to enhance learning and performance 
(Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009).  
From  an  organizational  learning  perspective,  being  able  to  access  a  portfolio  of  external 
companies is not only advantageous for the search of new knowledge, but also for the productive 
recombination of old elements. Some examples of strategic benefits embedded in CVC investments 
are  the  exposure  to  new  markets  and  technologies,  identification  of  acquisition  targets,  brand 
extension possibilities and knowledge spillovers from innovative start-ups to corporate investors 
(Siegel,  Siegel,  &  MacMillan,  1988).  Established  corporations  such  as  Xerox,  Lucent,  Nokia, 
Novartis, Pfizer and Intel have explicitly formalized their CVC activities by setting up investment 
programs  motivated  by  the  search  for  strategic  benefits,  such  as  exploiting  current  knowledge 
developed internally, learning from outside new ventures and creating new knowledge.  
This is particularly relevant when firms face industry uncertainties, such as marketing (i.e., Who 
are our  clients?) or technical  issues  (i.e., Which technical  standards will  prevail?). Uncertainty 
makes  it  challenging  to  anticipate  the  best  moves,  boosting  the  value  of  external  sources  of 
exploration and exploitation both at the intra- and at the inter-organizational level. As argued by 
Wahdwa and Kotha (2006: 819), for instance, ―CVC investment represented a strategic approach 
that incumbents employ to avoid being blindsided by technological change‖. 
Being an assortment of boundary spanning operations (Maula, 2001), the CVC context perfectly 
fits with the focus of our research. Specifically, it allows us to analyze the performance implications 
of  articulating  explorative  and  exploitative  strategies  across  internal  (i.e.  R&D  investments, 
diversification) and external resources (i.e. portfolio companies financed through CVC funds). 
The peculiar processes underlying CVC investment activities facilitates the access to external 
knowledge  that,  in  turn,  can  influence  the  process  of  knowledge  creation  within  corporations. 
Corporations may address established problems using new approaches or approaches that combines 
old  and  new  perspectives  that  have  been  internally  developed  (Ahuja  &  Katila,  2001).  Also, 
corporations may use their portfolios of CVC-backed firms to support, complement or augment 
their  internal  R&D  capabilities,  enter  new  markets  or  introduce  new  products  earlier  than 
competitors who lack access to external knowledge (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2004; Schildt, Maula & 
Keil, 2005). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that an increase in CVC investments is positively 
associated with increased future innovation by the investing firm (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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Furthermore, CVC activities allow corporations to align external investments with their strategic 
goals, thus allowing them to balance exploration and exploitation across boundaries in a systematic 
manner.  Indeed,  before  investing,  corporations  generally  undertake  extensive  due  diligence 
activities  related  to  proposed  companies  and  accompanying  details  such  as  business  plans, 
intellectual propriety rights, technology resources, proposed products and market prospects. This 
process provides a firm with a unique opportunity to learn about all aspects of a company before 
making a capital commitment (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). Also, after investing, firms usually 
institute various mechanisms for interacting with the company and for learning from it. 
In summary, since investing firms can leverage the patterns of idea combinations of a portfolio 
of CVC-backed firms, we propose that CVC investments may be used to resolve the exploration-
exploitation tension across organizational boundaries. 
 
---- Insert Fig. 2 Here ---- 
 
Our framework adopts a search perspective (Katila, 2000; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Katila & Chen, 
2008)), considering firms’ operations as a series of search processes, occurring within and beyond 
their  organizational  boundaries.  When  searching  for  new  technologies,  firms  and  managers  are 
constantly  dealing  with  the  fundamental  question  behind  a  broader  discourse  on  exploration-
exploitation: something old or something new?  
Our  suggestion  to  resolve  this  paradoxical  requirements  is  to  disentangle  overtime  the 
exploration-exploitation  tension  across  organizational  boundaries.  Figure  2  shows  the  different 
strategic configurations resulting from the contextual articulation of exploration and exploration 
across  the  organizational  boundaries  of  a  focal  firm.  Cross-boundary  Exploitation  represents  a 
strategy focused at maximizing exploitation in both the internal and external environments of the 
corporation. Cross-boundary Exploration represents a strategy profile mainly oriented towards the 
exploration  of  new  possibilities  in  both  the  internal  and  external  environments  of  the  focal 
corporation. Cross-boundary Ambidexterity (1) represents an internal exploitation orientation of a 
corporation paired to an external explorative orientation by a portfolio of CVC-backed companies. 
Cross-boundary  Ambidexterity  (2)  represent  an  internal  focus  on  exploration  by  a  corporation 
paired to an external focus on exploitation delegated to a portfolio of CVC-backed companies. 
Our approach results being quite different from the answers provided by previous works that 
suggested  to  externalize  either  exploitative  or  explorative  activities  through  outsourcing  or  by 
establishing alliances (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Holmqvist, 2004; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Our approach is also different from the idea to temporarily cycle Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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through periods of exploitation and periods of exploration (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998; Nickerson 
& Zenger, 2002; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Venkatraman, Lee, & Iyer, 2007).  
Classic examples of the proposed way of reasoning can be found at the intersection between the 
pharmaceutical and the biotechnology industry. Here the investing firms are the pharmaceutical 
corporations, founded under the technology paradigm of chemical screening, and the CVC-backed 
companies  are  biotechnology  ventures  founded  under  a  new  technology  paradigm  based  on 
molecular biology. The relatively new field of biotechnology embodies a scientific base (molecular 
biology)  that  is  significantly  different  from  the  knowledge  base  of  pharmaceuticals  (organic 
chemistry) so that a scientist who is trained in the framework of drug discovery and development 
based on chemical synthesis loses on the average around 80–100 percent of his or her skills when 
attempting to transition to the emerging framework of drug discovery and development based on 
molecular  biology  (Rothaermel  &  Boeker,  2008).  In  this  example,  pharmaceutical  firms  are 
experiencing an inherent internal trade off between exploration-exploitation: the knowledge and 
technologies  characterizing  biotechnology  are  competence  destroying  for  pharmaceutical  firms 
(Stuart,  Hoang,  and  Hybels,  1999),  but  biotechnology  companies  possess  capabilities  that 
traditional pharmaceutical firms can profitably draw upon to maintain their innovative presence. 
Considering  exploration  and  exploitation  as  two  distinct  dimensions  of  search  that  can  be 
pursued across the organizational boundaries of a focal firm, we also propose that the choice to 
pursue one or both of these dimensions affects a corporation’s financial performance. Theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that too little of either might reduce performance (Levinthal & March, 
1993;  Ancona  et  al.,  2001;  Benner  &  Tushman,  2002;  Gupta,  Smith  &  Shalley,  2006)  and 
significant support has been provided for models in which exploration and exploitation need not 
always  be  competing  activities,  but  can  be  complementary  (Katila  &  Ahuja,  2002;  Lavie  & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; Katila & Chen, 2008).  
Some studies have been investigating the impact of exploitation and exploration on performance 
by  surveying  business-units  (Gibson  &  Birkinshaw,  2004),  tracking  financial  markets 
(Kyriakopoulos & Moorman, 2004; Uotila et al., 2009) and sales growth (He & Wong, 2004), 
claiming that a balance of exploration and exploitation is needed because both excessive depth 
(exploitation) and scope (exploration) of search lead to negative effects. In this study we argue that 
in the CVC context the presence of different environments (i.e. internal versus external) may enable 
the  classic  trade-off  between  exploration-exploitation  to  be  managed  across  different  resource 
spaces, but the performance implications of cross-boundary exploration-exploitation strategies have 
never been considered. Also, current empirical studies mainly relied on cross-sectional survey data 
on managers’ perceptions  to  measure  constructs  and  boundary  conditions  (e.g., Gibson  & Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
11 
   
Birkinshaw,  2004;  Jansen  et  al.,  2006).  However,  surveys  are  prone  to  many  problems  when 
acquiring longitudinal data due to the limited reliability of informants’ retrospective accounts (e.g., 
Golden, 1992). To address this issue, we  focus on the actual realization of strategies by deploying 
archival data on financial performance vis a vis exploitative and explorative moves that have been 
implemented by the focal corporations and their portfolios of CVC-backed firms. 
In  the  following  sections  we  describe  our  sample,  data  sources  and  variables.  <financial 
performance will be defined as the market valuation of a firm (V) over the replacement value of its 
assets (A); search depth (exploitation) as the degree to which search activities revisits a firm's prior 
knowledge and search scope (exploration) as the degree of new knowledge that is employed. 
 
METHODS 
 
Sample and Data Gathering 
 
We test our theoretical model on the population of U.S. public firms active in CVC investments 
over the period 1996-2006. We focus on this time span as it represents the last and biggest wave in 
CVC history (Gompers & Lerner, 1998) with 2,382 financial rounds and 74% of global investments 
in the five quarters up to April 2008 (Ernst & Young, 2008).  
To build up our sample, we first identified all the CVC funds created in the U.S. over the period 
of analysis through the VentureXpert database by Thomson Financial. This corresponds to a total 
number of 281 CVC funds created by 239 corporations.  
Then, we refined this initial sample by dropping CVC firms with missing data for our main 
variables (reducing our sample to 239 funds and 202 corporations) and private corporations which 
do not have a matching code on financial databases like Worldscope. After this cleaning process, 
the sample included 221 CVC funds originated by 186 U.S. public firms in the period 1996-2006, 
with 1,616 funded companies and 2,382 rounds.  
Finally, after considering the sets of patent applications corresponding to each corporation and 
each CVC-backed firm, our final sample consists of 58 individual corporations and 58 portfolios 
composed by a total of 1,101 funded companies in the period 1996-2006. 
Each  individual  corporation  generated  on  average  204  patent  applications  per  year  (the  top 
patenting firm is HP with 1,543 patent applications per year in 2003) while each portfolio of CVC-
backed firms contributed on average 8 patent applications per year (the portfolio of CVC-backed 
firms linked to the CVC Fund ―Intel Capital‖ tops the list with 77 patent applications in 2003). Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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For  each  investor,  we  collected  from  VentureXpert  information  on  the  number  of  funds 
managed,  the  companies  belonging  to  their  investments  portfolio,  the  amount  invested  in  each 
company  and  in  each  round  and  the  date  of  each  round.  For  each  CVC-backed  company,  we 
extracted data about the main industry in which it operates, funding year, stage of development, 
country,  public  status  (private,  public,  subsidiary,  defunct,  government  owned)  and  investment 
status (active, LBO, defunct, acquisition), total amount of financing obtained by CVC firms, CVC 
firms involved, corresponding funds, number of financing rounds received and date of each round. 
To measure the amount of exploration and exploitation for each firm, we chose patents as data 
source for several reasons. First, since patents by definition include a description of a problem and a 
solution to that problem (Walker, 1995), they provide an accurate description of search activities to 
understand  how  firms  solve  problems  or  undertake  search  across  ideas  by  navigating  the 
exploration-exploitation tension overtime. Second, patent data are one of the few sources that give 
us a detailed and consistent chronology of search (Almeida, Song & Grant, 2002; Katila, 2002). 
Citation patterns in patents track the knowledge used over time and, because of their legal nature, 
are  precise  (Walker,  1995).  Third,  patent  measures  are  particularly  appropriate  for  testing 
hypotheses  that  include  learning  and  knowledge  creation.  Because  one  of  the  requirements  for 
patenting is novelty, each time an existing patent is cited as an antecedent for a new patent, it is 
used in a different context than before. Thus each repeated use of a citation serves as a distinct 
source for learning. Using prior art citations as a measure of search also has some limitations. 
Previous studies have shown that the propensity for patenting varies considerably across industries 
(e,g., Cockburn & Griliches, 1988). However, this is not a problem in this study because we focus 
on technology based firms for which patents have been shown to be an important appropriability 
mechanism (Arundel & Kabla, 1998). 
We used the third version of the NBER database
2 (Hall, 2009)) to retrieve the patent publication 
numbers of any firm. Ultimately, we downloaded from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
database 239,921 patents granted between 1990 and 2006, of which 203,436 held by the U.S. public 
firms of our sample and 36,485 held by their CVC-backed companies.  
We also used the Who Owns Whom directories to track subsidiaries of the corporations under 
investigation so that patents could be perfectly assigned to each firm. We then used custom -
programmed ASP and VB.net code t o assemble the patent citation data into the independent 
variables. These  programs  were  particularly  time -consuming  to  design  and  run because  they 
combined a large number of citation variables, interactions, and long time periods. We referred to 
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the period 1990-2006, instead than the above-mentioned period of analysis 1996-2006, to allow a 
five year lag for computing the exploration-exploitation indicators and avoid left censoring biases. 
Finally,  through  the  Worldscope  dataset  we  gathered  financial  data  for  the  corporations  to 
construct our dependent and control variables. In particular, we collected the following data: equity 
value, book value of long-term debt, net current liabilities, book value of equity and total assets, 
useful to construct our dependent variables  – Tobin’s q, in addition to total sales and level of 
corporate R&D expenses used as control variables in the econometric model. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Tobin’s q. To test our hypotheses we need to assess the value created through CVC investments, 
hence our dependent variable is a measure of firm’s changing value. The Tobin’s q is defined as the 
market valuation of a firm (V) over the replacement value of its assets (A). This is a good proxy and 
it is extensively used in the literature. A Tobin’s q greater than 1 suggests that the market value 
reflects some unmeasured or unrecorded assets of the company and that the firm has great growth 
opportunities. We use two different proxies to assess the numerator: in the first, V is the sum of firm 
equity value (given by the product of a firm's share price and the number of common stock shares 
outstanding), book value of long-term debt and net current liabilities (see Chung and Pruitt, 1995); 
in the second V is the sum of firm equity value, and the difference between total assets and book 
value of equity. A represents the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. 
Because Tobin’s q incorporates growth values of equity, it explicitly includes not only investor 
valuations of current operations but also investor expectations for future growth. Thus, it captures 
the lag between CVC investment and realized benefits.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
Several authors have used patent data as an indicator of search activity (see Stuart & Podolny, 1996; 
Katila, 2000; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Katila & Chen, 2008). The basic 
idea  is  to  measure  how  much  a  firm  exploits  existing  items  versus  explores  new  items  in  its 
innovation search overtime. In this study, we used firms' prior art patent citations to measure the 
depth  and  scope  of  search  for  each  focal  firm  and  its  corresponding  portfolio  of  CVC-backed 
companies.  Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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Our data consists of a panel of observations on firm-year. Depth (i.e. exploitation) and scope (i.e. 
exploration) and measures are computed on a yearly basis by pooling and partitioning data for each 
focal firm and its related portfolio of CVC-backed companies. ―Within-boundaries‖ indicators of 
depth and scope have been computed to describe the exploration-exploitation configuration of each 
corporation, while ―beyond boundaries‖ indicators have been computed considering overtime the 
portfolio of CVC-backed companies related to a specific corporation.  
The  depth  measure  corresponds  to  the  theoretical  concept  of  exploitation.  It  describes  how 
deeply  a  firm  redeploys  its  existing  knowledge  and  is  measured  by  counting  how  often  each 
element in the current domain of analysis has occurred in the n years before: 
 
 
 
The scope measure corresponds to the theoretical construct of exploration and describes how 
widely a firm explores new knowledge by counting how many of the current elements have never 
occurred before:  
 
 
 
Our software calculates depth and scope indicators by considering prior art patent citations in the 
analyzed time span. These data represent each firm’s citations bases yearly (see also Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) and to control for the expanding risk set (Stuart & Podolny, 1996), we used fractions 
when constructing the variables by dividing the citation counts in each indicator for the firm’s total 
number of citations that year. Also, organizational memory in high-technology companies has been 
found  to  be  imperfect  so  that  knowledge  depreciates  sharply,  losing  significant  value  within 
approximately five years (Argote, 1999). To account for this problem we computed all measures 
across a lifespan of 5 years in the past starting from the focal year
3.  
 
Corporate Depth (Corporate Exploitation). This variable considers the patents of the focal firm 
and describes accumulation of search experience with the same knowledge elements. We argued 
above that the more frequently a firm has used knowledge, the more deeply it knows it. Thus, 
                                                 
3 The use of these measures can be illustrated by considering a firm with ten patents. Each of the ten patents further cites ten other patents. 
On the average, eight out of the ten citations are new to the firm: that is, it has not used them during the past five years (we considered this 
lag-time period because a CVC fund has, on average, a life of five years in which the established firm can finance its portfolio companies 
through several rounds). In this example, the firm's search scope is thus 0.8. Of the remaining two "old" citations in each patent, on average, 
the firm has used one of them twice and the other three times. Thus, the search depth for this firm is 0.5. Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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search depth was measured as the average number of times a firm repeatedly used the citations in 
the patents it applied for. We created the depth variable by calculating the number of times that, on 
the average, each prior art citation in year t—1 was repeatedly used during the past five years.  
 
Corporate Scope (Corporate Exploration). This variable considers the patents of the focal firm and 
corresponds to the theoretical notion of exploration of new knowledge. It was computed as the 
proportion of previously unused citations (new citations) in a firm's focal year's list of citations. We 
assessed the share of citations in a focal year's citations that could not be found in the previous five 
years' list of patents and citations by that firm. Values for this variable range from 0 to 1. 
 
Following a similar approach, we consider overtime the portfolio of CVC-backed companies 
related  to  a  specific  focal  firm  to  calculate  ―beyond  boundaries‖  indicators  of  exploration-
exploitation.  Taking  a  portfolio  perspective  is  important  as  firms  form  ties  with  a  number  of 
external entities in the context of building partnerships, making the logic of inter-organizational 
learning central to understand tie formation. Portfolios are significant because they have aggregate 
properties (such as partner diversity and mix of peculiar strengths) that could impact learning and 
performance as a whole (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003) while being less meaningful for single ties.  
 
Portfolio Depth (Portfolio Exploitation). This variable represents the average search depth of all 
the CVC-backed companies in a given portfolio. To obtain this variable we first considered each 
one of the 1,101 funded companies in our sample on a yearly basis and computed individual depth 
indicators as the number of times that, on the average, each prior art citation in year t—1 was 
repeatedly used during the past five years. Then, we considered the list of CVC-backed firms tied to 
a specific corporation in a given year and computed the average depth across that list of companies. 
 
Portfolio Scope (Portfolio Exploration). This variable represents the average search scope of all the 
CVC-backed firms in a given portfolio. To obtain this variable we first computed individual scope 
indicators for each one of the 1,101 funded companies in our sample as the share of citations in a 
focal year's citations that could not be found in the previous five years' list of patents and citations 
by that firm. Then, we considered the list of CVC-backed companies tied to a specific investor in a 
given year and computed the average scope across that list of companies. 
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Cross-boundary Exploitation. This variable is calculated as Corporate Depth*Portfolio Depth and 
represents  a  strategy  focused  at  maximizing  exploitation  in  both  the  internal  and  external 
environments of the corporation. 
 
Cross-boundary Exploration. This variable is calculated as Corporate Scope*Portfolio Scope and 
represents a strategy profile mainly oriented towards the exploration o new possibilities in both the 
internal and external environments of the focal corporation. 
 
Cross-boundary Ambidexterity (1). This variable is calculated as Corporate Depth*Portfolio Scope 
and represents an internal exploitation orientation of a corporation paired to an external exploration 
orientation by a portfolio of CVC-backed companies.  
 
Cross-boundary Ambidexterity (2). This variable is calculated as Corporate Scope*Portfolio Depth 
to  represent  an  internal  focus  on  exploration  by  a  corporation  paired  to  an  external  focus  on 
exploitation delegated to a portfolio of CVC-backed companies.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Since larger firms possess greater resources for investing in research and, thus, are more likely to 
pursue more internal R&D as well as external CVC (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005: 957), we control 
for corporate size. We construct this variable using the logarithm of corporate sales in the same 
year  in  which  the  portfolio  has  been  funded  (Log(Corporate  Size)).  To  take  into  account  the 
variance  in  inputs  for  innovation  activity  which  impacts  on  a  firm’s  propensity  to  innovate 
(Wodhwa and Kotha, 2006) and, thus, to invest in diversified CVC programs, we also controlled for 
R&D expenses, which represent all direct and indirect costs related to the creation and development 
of new processes, techniques, applications and products with commercial aim. Since our measure of 
R&D expenditure can be highly correlated with firm size, we use R&D Intensity (instead of only 
R&D expenses), measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to corporate investors’ sales in the fund 
vintage year. We gather these data on firm’s sales and R&D expenditures from Worldscope. 
Finally  we  use  a  dummy  variable  (DUM_activelink)  to  control  for  the  years  in  which  the 
relationship between the corporation and its portfolio may be strengthened by the presence of one or 
more rounds of financing.  
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RESULTS 
 
Testing our theoretical model with a dynamic longitudinal panel data research design required us to 
account for endogeneity when assessing strategy financial performance. ―In strategic management 
research, we often wish to draw conclusions about the superiority of one strategy compared to 
alternatives so that we can aid managers with their business decisions. A difficulty in making such 
assessments is that firms purposely choose their strategies based on their capabilities and industry 
conditions.  Because  firms  self-select  the  strategies  we  observe,  we  are  not  able  to  make  the 
comparison of strategy performance in an experimental setting where firms are randomly assigned 
strategies‖.  (Shaver,  1998:572).  Empirical  models  that  do  not  account  for  this  and  regress 
performance  measures  on  strategy  choice  variables  are  potentially  misspecified  and  their 
conclusions incorrect. We did so by using a GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) via the 
xtdpdsys Stata module. 
 
--- Insert Tab. 1 Here --- 
--- Insert Tab. 2 Here --- 
 
We first present some descriptive statistics for our variables. The corporations in the sample 
differ widely in R&D Intensity (13.069 and s.d. 10.353) but not in size (15.790 and s.d. 1.998) and 
performance (0.474 and s.d. 0.276). Second, we observe that the average level of exploration for 
corporations  (0.671)  is  lower  than  the  level  obtained  for  the  portfolio  companies  (0.728). 
Conversely, corporations tend to be more focused on exploitation (1.281) than their CVC-backed 
companies (1.100). Third, Table 1 allows to compare the levels of Cross-boundary Exploitation 
with the levels of Cross-boundary Exploration. Our statistics suggest that the former is greater than 
the latter (1.534 versus 0.492) and that the tendency to use both internal and external resources to 
exploit previous knowledge differs more among firms (s.d. 4.046) than the behaviors towards cross-
boundary explorative research (s.d. 0.272). Finally, our statistics point out that the combination of 
internal  exploitation  orientation  of  a  corporation  and  the  external  exploitation  orientation  by  a 
portfolio  of  CVC-backed  companies  is,  on  average,  more  common  (0.916)  than  the  opposite 
combination where internal focus on exploration by a corporation is paired to an external focus on 
exploitation delegated to a portfolio of CVC-backed companies (0.718).   
After inspecting descriptive statistics, we set out to run the GMM regression model. The results 
from the system GMM regression model appear in Table 3. The first column reports the baseline 
model in which Tobin’s q at the year t-1, sales, sales at the year t-1, R&D intensity and the dummy Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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are included as control variables. In model 2, we introduced search depth and search scope for both 
corporations and CVC-backed companies to assess those variables' effects on market valuation. 
Finally, in model 3, we included all the possible combinations of  interaction between search depth 
and search scope for corporations and portfolio companies. We base our discussion of the results on 
the full model, represented in column 3. 
Regarding the main effects, pursuing explorative efforts through CVC investments is positively 
related to the corporation performance (Tobin’s q). That is, the amount of exploration generated by 
a set of CVC-backed firms has  a positive impact upon the market valuation of the underlying 
corporation. Conversely, the interaction between the amount of exploration pursued internally by a 
corporation and the explorative effort of a portfolio of CVC-backed firms has a negative effect upon 
the  corporation’s  financial  performance.  Indeed,  the  regression  result  for  Portfolio  Exploration 
shows  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  (0.543**,  s.d.  0.230)  while  ―Cross-boundary 
Exploration‖ display a negative and significant coefficient (-0.604**, s.d. 0.256).  
Cross-boundary  Ambidexterity,  the  interaction  between  the  amount  of  exploitation  pursued 
internally by a corporation and the corresponding amount of exploration pursued by its portfolio of 
CVC-backed  companies,  impacts  negatively  upon  the  corporation’s  financial  performance.  The 
coefficient  is  negative  and  significant  (-0.103**,  s.d.  0.051).  Quite  surprisingly,  this  result 
contradicts the lion’s share of ambidexterity related literature, suggesting a bump in performance 
for those firms that concurrently pursue exploration and exploitation.  
 
--- Insert Tab. 3 Here --- 
 
The lag term of Tobin’s q is positive and significant (1.218, p<0.01%) suggesting that the market 
valuation in the year before (t-1) the time of interest positively impacts on the market valuation 
registered during time t. The opposite effect, instead, has been found for sales (-0.0632, p<0.1). 
Surprisingly, the effect of R&D Intensity at the year t-1 on our dependent variable seems to be 
negative on the level of performance of the subsequent year (-0.00187, p<0.5).  As a robustness 
check,  we  also  estimated  our  model  using  the  market-to-book  ratio  as  our  dependent  variable, 
defined as the market value of the ordinary (common) equity divided by the balance sheet value of 
the ordinary (common) equity in the company. Estimates from these models were consistent to 
those using Tobin’s q. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
This  study  set  out  to  empirically  test  the  relationship  between  a  corporation’s  exploration-
exploitation  activities  and  its  market-based  performance  in  presence  of  CVC  investments.  Past 
research claimed that a balance of exploration and exploitation is needed because both excessive 
depth (exploitation) and scope (exploration) lead to negative effects. Limits to improvement and 
rigidity have been associated with high levels of exploitation (Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006) while 
knowledge integration costs and decreasing reliability have been proposed for extremely high levels 
of exploration.  In the CVC  context  the presence of different  environments  (i.e. internal  versus 
external) may enable the classic trade-off between exploration-exploitation to be managed across 
different  resource  spaces,  yet  the  performance  implications  of  cross-boundary  exploration-
exploitation strategies have never been studied. 
Past  research on inter-organizational  learning pointed to  the fact  that organizations  may use 
various mechanisms, such as alliances (Gulati, 1998; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), joint ventures 
(Kogut, 1991), M&As  (Ahuja & Katila, 2001) or equity investments (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 
2005b;  Schildt  et  al.,  2005)  to  enact  their  external  environments.  This  stream  of  studies  often 
suggested that internal resources might be used for exploitative goals, while external resources can 
be seen as vehicles of new knowledge to foster strategic change and thus exploration.  
Our preliminary results show that a strict focus on exploration confined in a portfolio of CVC-
backed firms may have a positive impact upon the focal firm’s financial performance. However, 
when this logic is translated into an inter-organizational context where both an internal and an 
external dimensions interact, the positive effects exerted by confining exploration in the external 
environment will be eroded. Indeed, when a set of redundant efforts in exploring new knowledge 
occurs both within and beyond the organizational boundaries of the focal firm, the ultimate result is 
a  homogenous  orientation  toward  exploration  that  may  be  prone  to  the  same  issues  usually 
predicated for extreme within-boundaries orientations. 
A one-sided focus on exploration in both the internal and external environment of a corporation 
may hamper its ability to translate the amount of new knowledge into viable products or services. 
With this respect, our result is consistent with past research arguing that the wider the scope of the 
knowledge  to  be  integrated,  the  more  complex  are  the  problems  of  creating  and  managing 
integration (Grant, 1996: 377). Thus, eventually, the costs of integration will exceed the benefits of 
exploring new knowledge. Furthermore, corporations that principally pursue exploration run an 
inherent risk because their returns are difficult to estimate a priori and may take a long time to 
materialize (Raish & Birkinshaw, 2008). Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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Finally,  the  previous  ambidexterity  literature  has  been  suggesting  to  resolve  the  above-
mentioned negative effects by combining exploitative and explorative efforts across boundaries so 
that exploration is pursued in one module of a modular system while exploitation is pursued in 
another. In the specific case of CVC, a focal firm that searches locally by using knowledge that is 
closely  related  to  their  pre-existing  knowledge  bases  (e.g.  Martin  &  Mitchell,  1998;  Stuart  & 
Podolny, 1996; Huygens et al., 2001) can move away from current certainties and explore new 
opportunities (March, 1991; Miner, Bassoff & Moorman, 2001) through a set of investments in 
external  companies.  Contrary  to  expectations,  our  results  point  to  a  negative  effect  of  Cross-
boundary Ambidexterity (the interaction between the amount of exploitation pursued internally by a 
corporation and the corresponding amount of exploration pursued by its portfolio of CVC-backed 
companies) upon the corporation’s financial performance. A possible explanation for this result 
may  be  related  to  the  peculiar  nature  of  our  performance  measure.  Since  Tobin’s  q  explicitly 
includes investor expectations for future growth (capturing the lag between corporate strategy and 
realized benefits), negative expectations about firms that implemented ambidextrous strategies may 
reflect  that  a  ―compromise‖  between  exploration  and  exploitation  is  perceived  as  a  signal  of 
weakness  by  the  investment  community.  That  is,  attempting  to  reconcile  exploration  and 
exploitation strategies may raise the risk of being perceived as a firm being good at neither or 
―stuck in the middle‖ (Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006). With this respect, most of the ambidexterity 
related literature suggests balancing exploitation and exploration makes sense for many firms and 
may even be necessary for survival (e.g., Christensen, 1998; Lewin & Volberda, 1999), yet other 
scholars say the opposite: specialization rather than duality might be entirely viable and long-term 
survival  may be  feasible without balance by pursuing only  exploration or exploitation  (March, 
1991; Benner & Tushman, 2003). With this respect, our results stress the need for future endeavors 
to focus on the crucial role of inter-company learning in disentangling the exploration-exploitation 
tension across organizational boundaries. 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
Preliminary Conclusions and Main Contributions 
 
Maula, Keil and Zahra (2003) showed that, as corporations invest in start-ups, they enhance their 
ability to recognize potentially destructive discontinuities in the marketplace faster than rivals who 
fail to make such investments. The aim of this research has been to investigate how firms can Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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balance  over  time  their  explorative  and  exploitative  behaviors  not  only  through  internal 
investments, but also referring to resources which reside beyond their organizational boundaries.  
We contributed to extant research in different ways. First, previous studies generally analyzed 
the  trade-off  between  exploration  and  exploitation  either  within  the  firm  by  using  knowledge 
developed  through  internal  projects  (Katila  &  Ahuja,  2002;  Nerkar,  2003)  or  outside  the  firm 
through collaborations with external partners (Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Koza & Lewin, 
1998; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). No attempts, to our knowledge, have been performed to combine 
and integrate the two dimensions in a systematic manner. 
Second, we contributed to the literature on CVC by analyzing how equity investments in young, 
small and high potential companies impact on the knowledge base of the firm in terms of balance 
between  exploration  and  exploitation.  Previous  studies  in  this  filed  could  not  directly  test 
knowledge flows between corporate investors and their portfolio firms. Research generally focused 
on CVC as a collaborative mode used by corporations to explore new opportunities and open new 
technological  windows  (Chesbrough  &  Tucci,  2004,  Dushnitsky  &  Lenox,  2005a  and  2005b; 
Wadhwa & Kotha, 2008), disregarding the other critical goal that drives corporations to become 
active in CVC investments, that is, the exploitation of existing knowledge in more efficient ways. In 
this work, instead, we integrated the two dimensions by representing CVC as a mechanism which 
sustains the strategic growth of a firm through both a local and a distant search of knowledge 
creation. 
Finally, also our method is novel and extensive as we were able to develop more comprehensive 
and detailed measures of search than prior studies. In particular, our measures made it possible to 
accurately express central features of internal vis-à-vis external search processes.  
 
Avenues for Future Research  
 
Extant  literature  tended  to  resolve  exploration-exploitation  trade-off  focusing  on  a  specific 
knowledge domain in isolation (i.e. technologies, on one hand, or markets, on the other hand). 
Instead, in the next steps of the paper, we will analyze how the interplay between exploration and 
exploitation  performed  outside  the  firm  can  impact  the  interaction  between  exploration  and 
exploitation within the firm in different ways, depending on the domain under observation such as 
ideas, technologies or markets. 
Furthermore, measures of technological knowledge include not only patent citations but also the 
technological domains (IPCs). We will used both these types of data and we will combine them 
with measures of commercialization like trademark classifications, in order to track the innovation Enrico Forti & Laura Toschi – Department of Management, University of Bologna 
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process from upstream to downstream activities. Usually, longitudinal studies focus on one end of 
the process or the other, but do not link the two. Nevertheless, as argued by Schumpeter (1939: 85) 
"the making of the invention and the carrying out of the corresponding innovation are, economically 
and  sociologically,  two  entirely  different  things".  To  accomplish  this  goal  we  will  collect  an 
original database where both patents and trademarks will be used as proxies to capture two different 
nuances of the innovative process. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Fig 1. Typical Structure of Corporate Venture Capital (adapted from Ernst et al., 2005). 
 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 2  – Conceptual Framework: Exploration-Exploitation across Boundaries and Domains 
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TABLES  
 
Table 1 – Main Descriptive Statistics (Continuous Variables) 
VARIABLE  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Corporate Exploitation  328  1.281  1.421  0  10.547 
Corporate Exploration  328  0.671  0.202  0.133  1 
Portfolio Exploitation  328  1.100  2.248  0  15.601 
Portfolio Exploration  328  0.728  0.322  0  1 
Cross-boundary Exploitation  328  1.534  4.046  0  30.246 
Cross-boundary Exploration  328  0.492  0.272  0  1 
Cross-boundary Ambidexterity (1)  328  0.916  1.221  0  10.547 
Cross-boundary Ambidexterity (2)  328  0.718  1.504  0  11.688 
Tobin's q  328  0.474  0.276  0.015  3.100 
R&D Intensity  328  13.069  10.353  0  104.860 
Log(Corporate Sales)  328  15.790  1.998  6.365  19.150 
           
 
 
Table 2 – Correlations 
 
 VARIABLE  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
                 
1  Corporate Exploitation  1             
2  Corporate Exploration  -0.7371***  1           
3  Portfolio Exploitation  0.0392  -0.0459  1         
4  Portfolio Exploration  -0.0359  0.0546  -0.6414***  1       
5  Tobin's q  -0.0333  0.0695  0.0293  0.0693  1     
6  R&D Intensity  0.0389  -0.0092  -0.071  0.0078  -0.3545***  1   
7  Log(Corporate Sales)  -0.1016*  0.0163  0.0176  -0.0283  0.1602***  -0.4799***  1 
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Table 3 – GMM Estimation 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Tobin's q  Tobin's q  Tobin's q 
           
L.Tobin's q  1.077***  1.229***  1.218*** 
 
(0.0424)  (0.0467)  (0.0471) 
Log(Corporate Sales)  -0.0190  0.00486  0.0162 
 
(0.0233)  (0.0240)  (0.0244) 
L.Log(Corporate Sales)  -0.0153  -0.0515**  -0.0632*** 
 
(0.0215)  (0.0226)  (0.0230) 
Corporate Exploitation 
 
-0.00922  0.0745 
   
(0.00803)  (0.0485) 
Corporate Exploration 
 
-0.119**  0.342 
   
(0.0512)  (0.236) 
Portfolio Exploitation 
 
0.00221  0.0468 
   
(0.00622)  (0.0535) 
Portfolio Exploration 
 
0.00400  0.543** 
   
(0.0457)  (0.230) 
Cross-boundary Exploitation 
   
-0.0143 
     
(0.0140) 
Cross-boundary Exploration 
   
-0.604** 
     
(0.256) 
Cross-boundary Ambidexterity (1) 
   
-0.103** 
     
(0.0512) 
Cross-boundary Ambidexterity (2) 
   
-0.0408 
     
(0.0581) 
DUM_activelink  0.0129  0.00401  0.00426 
 
(0.0135)  (0.0139)  (0.0139) 
R&D Intensity L1  0.000207  -0.00180**  -0.00187** 
 
(0.000713)  (0.000837)  (0.000845) 
Constant  0.492***  0.737***  0.332 
 
(0.110)  (0.127)  (0.246) 
        Observations  472  328  328 
Number of Corporations  59  58  58 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       